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The View from Korea and East Asia
Seok Won SONG
I
These two papers which have presented perspectives of contemporary America on the basis of the European 
experience have been extremely valuable, particularly in terms of their relevance to the situation in Korea where 
diametrically opposed views of the United States collide head on with each other. Moreover, it can be said that 
the European experience not only has relevance to the Korean case but also to the broader East Asian region as 
well. Nonetheless, I will limit the scope of my comments to those aspects of the papers that are particularly rele-
vant to Korea.
Professor Brunkhorst seeks to explain the origin of the current crisis in world society by examining recent 
American foreign policy which has aimed to promote a democratic order through essentially hegemonic means. 
In that regard his outlook seems consistent with that of Massimo Fini who focuses on the strident criticism that 
Europe has heaped on the United States in response to its foreign policy. It is apparent that America currently has 
the object of proliferating democracy on a global scale, however, for many countries, the democratic order being 
promoted signifi es little more than the promotion of something “made in America”. Basically, these countries 
 recognize the intrinsic value of democracy in a universal sense but regard the “made in America” version as lack-
ing in that universality, as something that embodies particularized American values that reek of Hollywood. 
Moreover, they perceive that the US, for all the talk of a democratic order, seems to work on the assumption of its 
own righteousness in each case so that its assertions can only be regarded as self-serving.
Nevertheless, if we separate out that which is (in some sense) intrinsically American from the aim of 
 American foreign policy, ostensibly a democratic order, then we have to acknowledge that this is not in itself so 
reprehensible an aim. Democracy in itself has a degree of universal value; the problem is the hegemonic means 
adopted to achieve the aim of that foreign policy. As is well known, America has been pursuing foreign policy on 
the basis of its overwhelming military power. Yet there are two distinct aspects to the strategy employed to 
 effectively promote American national security in the 21st century that have been emphasized,—one is “military 
transformation” and the other is “transformational diplomacy”. The former has the aim of increasing the strategic 
fl exibility of the American military; the latter signifi es an attempt to pursue a more ideological form of diplomacy 
through the creation of an integrative network to promote the diffusion of freedom, the new aim of foreign policy 
in the 21st century. With the backup of this network America has been able to capitalize on revolutionary advances 
in IT—quite apart from military and economic means—to make a direct appeal to the world’s citizenry and 
spread American-style freedom.
The major concern in Korea is simply how America’s attempts to realize a democratic order through hege-
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monic means will impinge on the issue of North Korea’s suspected nuclear weapons, (a matter of natural concern 
for the people of the Korean Peninsula and indeed East Asia as a whole), and what sort of long-term policy impli-
cations that may have. Basically, if the six nations’ talks which were instigated to address the issue of North 
Korea’s suspected nuclear weapons fail to produce a satisfactory outcome, it is feared that the United States will 
seek an immediate solution in terms of its “transformational diplomacy”. That would mean, essentially, attempt-
ing to directly impose liberty on the North, something which would produce dire consequences for not only the 
security of Korea but also the broader Asian community. The current criticisms of the US in Korea at present are 
deeply connected to precisely such concerns. As Professor Brunkhorst says, America currently has the power to 
thoroughly impose its will on a global scale; yet this is not in any way something that is backed up by an inherent 
right to do so. In any event, it is clear that the basis of current criticisms of America in Korea lies in the area of 
foreign policy.
II
While discontent with American foreign policy forms the basis of a great deal of discontent with America in 
Korea, it is certainly not the only factor. One more important focus of discontent leading to anti-Americanism 
stems from issues related to the problem of “democratization” within Korea,—I would like to briefl y touch on 
those issues.
The historical point when Korea began to have a substantial relationship with America was from around 
World War Two (the fi rst contact was actually in the latter half of the nineteenth century under circumstances that 
were not exactly amiable: there was a strong sense of threat generated by the United States given the manner in 
which it aggressively approached Korea on the basis of overwhelming military force, although it is also true that 
there was not so much of an awareness of the US as a distinct country but rather as one of the Western Powers). 
For Korea following the end of World War II, America was not only the liberator from Japanese colonial oppres-
sion but also came to be considered as the social model to follow in every regard. In every sphere of the polity,—
from the educational, political and fi nancial systems to everyday social living—American values and practices 
were introduced without a moment’s hesitation. The people that took the lead in society were returnees from the 
United States who had been converted to Christianity like Seungman Lee and the ensuing treaty for mutual 
defense, along with the establishment of American military bases and the receipt of economic aid to assist in 
 economic recovery, served primarily to strengthen the trend towards greater dependence on the US in security 
and defense matters.
However, when we get to the 1980s we fi nd that there was a contrasting mood of light and shade on the 
streets of Seoul, something that we might liken to that witnessed by Paul Hazard in 1930s Paris. For the Korean 
people who had become enamored with “Made in America” democracy and the American lifestyle there was 
an increasing awareness that the lapse in Korean democratic culture stemmed from the long term support given 
by America to Korea’s authoritarian regime. Naturally, from the 1960s onwards there were also phenomena 
emerging that matched what Rubenstein and Smith designated as “Third World anti-Americanism” (see Alvin Z. 
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Rubinstein and Donald E. Smith, Anti-Americanism in the Third World: Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy, 
1985). For instance there was the more or less continuous backlash against the interventionism of the United 
States that was galvanized by issues such as the normalization of ties between Korea and Japan and the dispatch-
ing of Korean troops to Vietnam. Nevertheless, from the 1980s onwards there emerged a greater depth and 
sophistication in the nature of criticisms of America whether dealing with emotive responses or ideals, or whether 
you were engaging with the intelligentsia or farmers. The issues that provided the foci for debate were the estab-
lishment of responsibility in the Kwanju Incident, the backlash against authoritarianism, the resistance to trade 
liberalization, along with the question of revising the Status of Forces Agreement which exculpated the crimes of 
American  servicemen. Moreover there was the emergence of Anti-Americanism in 1986 which armed itself with 
the self-reliance (Juche) ideology of North Korea. This movement was divided between groups that placed 
greater emphasis on either ethnic reunifi cation or the establishment and promotion of democracy but they held in 
 common a sense of Anti-Americanism (and are currently at the centre of government).
Ironically, the fact remains that the authoritarian regime in Korea which persisted for so many years in the 
name of modernization/ Westernization/ Americanization was actually sustained and strengthened by traditional-
ist values. In this regard it remains necessary for the Korean people who have become familiar with the American 
lifestyle to not so much re-appropriate their traditions (in contrast with the European experience) but appropriate 
democracy as a universal value.
Finally, one further point of signifi cance to highlight with regard to anti-Americanism is the way in which 
American and Korean views on the divided Korean peninsular and the means of bringing the two parties together 
have become increasingly divergent.
III
In East Asia it must certainly appear that, unlike Europe, the aims of mutual understanding and cooperation 
have been subsumed by overweening confl icts generated by unilateralist patriotism and extreme ethnic conscious-
ness. There are many things which surely need to be done to address these divisions but I wonder which avenues 
present themselves most pertinently from the European experience.
I also fi nd myself wondering why a country like America which has such a strong tradition of pragmatism 
comes to rely so heavily on religious sentiment, or at least a pronounced moralism, when pursuing its foreign 
 policy.
Also, how far should Europe or East Asia restrain the United States, and in what areas should they be 
 supportive?
In relation to the issue of Americanism and Anti-Americanism we still need to clarify what the European 
experience can teach East Asia and what in particular we can learn from that history.
